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Abstract	  	  In	   this	   paper	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   moral	   distress	   is	   an	   emotional	   response	   to	   an	  ethical	  dilemma,	  and	  that	  to	  date	  the	  literature	  has	  largely	  failed	  to	  address	  the	  fundamental	  questions	   that	  need	  to	  be	  answered	   in	  response	   to	   this	  emotional	  response.	  Firstly	  does	  moral	  distress	  accurately	   identify	  a	  wrong	  being	  done	  to	  patients?	  Secondly,	  if	  it	  does,	  can	  nurses	  carry	  out	  this	  ‘wrong	  doing’	  but	  not	  be	  responsible	   for	   the	   consequences	  of	   their	   actions?	  A	  narrative	   that	   reflects	   the	  emotional	  nature	  of	  moral	  distress	  is	  presented,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  providing	  some	  answers	  to	  these	  questions.	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Introduction	  	  There	   is	   a	   pervasive	   premise	   in	   medical	   ethics	   following	   a	   long	   tradition	   in	  philosophy:	  that	  is,	  that	  a	  dichotomy	  exists	  between	  the	  emotional	  and	  rational	  self,	   and	   that	   ultimately	   it	   is	   the	   rational	   self	   that	   ought	   to	   be	   relied	   upon	   for	  ethical	  decisions.	  However,	  the	  emotions	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  play	  a	  motivating	  role	  in	  ethical	   living.[1,2,3]	   Their	   inclusion	   in	   the	   concept	   of	   self,	   and	   arguably	   the	  professional	  self,	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  central	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  unified	  agency.[4]	  	  	  Supporting	   this	   stance,	  much	   of	  what	   is	   experienced	   as	   ‘ethical’	   in	   the	   clinical	  environment	  presents	  itself	  primarily	  in	  an	  emotional	  form.	  At	  its	  most	  raw	  this	  emotion	   can	   be	   described	   as	   ‘distress’.	   One	   such	   form	   of	   distress	   is	   termed	  ‘moral	  distress’.	  This	  has	  been	  described	  as	   the	   feelings	  and	  experiences	  which	  result	   from	   a	   moral	   conflict,	   where	   one	   knows	   the	   correct	   action	   to	   take	   but	  constraints	   lead	   to	   an	   inability	   to	   implement	   this	   action.[5]	   Moral	   distress	   is	  often	  experienced	   in	   relation	   to	  medical	   care	   that	   is	  perceived	  by	  nurses	   to	  be	  futile	  and	  that	  they	  feel	  complicit	  in	  contributing	  to.	  This	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  for	  this	  paper.	  	  Solutions	   to	   moral	   distress	   have	   been	   offered,	   such	   as	   promoting	  multidisciplinary	   collaboration	   through	   ethics	   training	   and	   ethics	   rounds.	   The	  only	  available	  study	  to	  address	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  such	  interventions	  in	  relation	  to	  moral	   distress	   in	  nurses,	   found	   that	   although	   staff	   valued	   the	   interventions,	  they	  had	  no	  impact	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  moral	  distress	  that	  the	  staff	  experienced.[6]	  I	  propose	  that	  a	  significant	  cause	  for	  this	  is	  that	  such	  interventions	  tend	  to	  rely	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on	  principled	  ethical	  analysis	  of	  patient	  care	  decisions.	  In	  so	  doing,	  they	  overlook	  the	  emotional	  experience	  of	   ‘moral	  distress’	  that	  I	  will	  argue,	   is	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  nurse’s	  sense	  of	  moral	  agency.	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  present	  an	  experience	  of	  moral	  distress	  in	  narrative	  form.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  in	  such	  a	  situation	  the	  emotional	  response	  leads	  two	  fundamental	  questions	  for	  the	  nurse	  to	  answer.	  Firstly,	  she	  needs	  to	  identify	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  act	  in	  question	  is	  objectively	  wrong	  for	  the	  patient.	  	  If	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  first	  is	  yes,	   then	  secondly,	   she	  needs	   to	  address	  her	  moral	  agency	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  act.	  She	  needs	  to	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  wrong	  for	  her	  to	  carry	  out	  that	  act.	  Conscientious	  objection	  is	  one	  action	  she	  could	  choose	  to	  enact	  and	  has	  already	  been	  proposed	  as	   a	   valid	   solution	  by	  Kalvemark	   et	   al,	  who	  argued	   that	  nurses	  working	  in	  neonatal	  intensive	  care	  should	  be	  supported	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	   involvement	   in	  medical	   care	   that	   they	   perceived	   to	   be	   futile.	   If	   instead,	   she	  decides	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  act,	  she	  has	  to	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  she	  is	  correct	  in	  her	  perception	  of	  moral	   agency;	   that	   is,	   that	   in	   carrying	  out	   the	   ‘wrong’	   act,	   she	   is	  indeed	  responsible	  for	  its	  consequences,	  and	  therefore	  suffer	  moral	  distress.	  The	  alternative	  to	  this	  is	  to	  accept	  that	  even	  if	  the	  action	  is	  wrong	  for	  the	  patient,	  the	  nurse	   is	   not	   wrong	   in	   performing	   the	   act,	   because	   it	   has	   been	   prescribed	   by	  someone	  else.	  The	  latter	  decision	  will	  not	  remove	  all	  distress,	  but	  it	  will	  remove	  ‘moral	  distress’,	  that	  has	  been	  described,	  and	  perhaps	  under	  most	  circumstances,	  is	  wrongly	  identified	  as	  a	  valid	  perception	  of	  wrong	  doing.[7]	  	  In	   keeping	  with	   the	   emotional	   nature	   of	  moral	   distress	   I	  will	   now	  present	   the	  narrative	   that	   remains	  grounded	   in	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  experience,	   and	   that	  also	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attempts	   to	  offer	  arguments	   in	  support	  of	  one	  set	  of	  answers	   in	  relation	  to	   the	  questions	  above.	  	  	  Grim	  orders	  and	  fragile	  birds.	  	  It	   is	   the	  year	  2000	  and	   I	  want	  you	   to	   imagine	  a	  ward	  of	  patients.	  You	  are	   in	   a	  nurse’s	  uniform.	  You	  are	  young	  and	  junior.	  Your	  name	  badge	  announces	  you	  as	  ‘Staff	  Nurse’.	   	   There	   are	   bays	   along	   the	   length	   of	   the	  ward,	   each	  housing	   eight	  patients,	   most	   with	   small	   machines	   by	   their	   beds	   that	   will	   spew	   clouds	   of	  medicine	   via	   facemasks.	   Just	   now	   the	   machines	   are	   quiet.	   But	   wait	   until	   the	  drugs	   round,	   and	   one	   by	   one	   they’ll	   waken,	   the	   sound	   of	   clapped	   out	   motors	  reaching	  a	   crescendo,	  until	   one	  by	  one	   the	  patients	   turn	   them	  off.	  The	  ward	   is	  full.	  Patients	  sit.	  Some	  wander.	  Others	  lie	  in	  side	  rooms	  with	  half	  closed	  doors.	  In	  one	  of	   the	  bays,	   sitting	   in	   the	   corner	   is	   an	  old	   lady.	  Her	  hair	   is	   curly	  grey.	  The	  nightdress	  she	  wears	  gapes	  about	  her	  chest.	   Its	  shoulders	  appear	   to	  hang	  off	  a	  coat	   hanger.	   The	   sleeves	   are	   billowy	  with	   skinny	   arms	   flapping	   between.	   The	  fabric	  that	  used	  to	  fit	  now	  serves	  as	  a	  frame	  that	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  skeletal	  body	   that	   the	  woman	  has	   come	   to	   inhabit.	  The	   flesh	  on	  her	   face	  has	   collapsed	  into	   the	   shape	   of	   a	   skull.	  Her	   dentures	   rattle	   and	  dance	  when	   she	   speaks.	  Her	  eyes	  are	  bright	  blue.	  They	  shine	  and	  dart	  side	  to	  side	  until	  you	  approach,	  sit,	  and	  touch	  her	  to	  gain	  her	  attention.	  There’s	  something	  bird	  like	  about	  her.	  Let’s	  call	  her	  Mrs	  Bird.	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Her	  eyes	  settle	  and	  rest	  into	  yours.	  The	  tubing	  snaking	  from	  the	  wall,	  across	  her	  bare	  ribs,	  around	  her	  ears	  and	  nose	  delivers	  oxygen.	  No,	  breathing	  isn’t	  quite	  the	  right	  word.	  Panting.	  She	  pants,	  and	  has	  done	  for	  years.	  	  	  You	   touch	  her	  hand.	  Her	   fingers	  are	  cold,	  her	   lips	  have	  a	  blue	  hue.	  The	  oxygen	  helps	  to	  keep	  her	  alive.	  Alive	  enough	  to	  eat	  tiny	  portions	  of	  food.	  Alive	  enough	  to	  have	  an	  echo	  of	  recognition	  when	  she	  sees	  her	  son	  visit.	  Alive	  enough	  to	  have	  a	  sense	  that	  there	  are	  things	  to	  do.	  Alive	  enough	  to	  feel	  the	  oxygen	  tubing	  pulling	  at	  her	  face	  when	  she	  gets	  up	  to	  see	  to	  her	  jobs.	  Alive	  enough	  to	  have	  the	  sense	  -­‐	  in	   the	  midst	  of	  her	   confusion	   -­‐	   to	   take	   the	   tubing	  off	   and	  wander	   in	  pursuit	  of	  what	  exists	  in	  her	  thoughts.	  Alive	  enough	  to	  feel	  your	  hand	  and	  to	  be	  comforted	  by	  it.	  	  The	   doctors	   do	   their	   round	   and	   take	   note	   that	   you	   have	   seen	   her	   condition	  deteriorate.	  This	   is	  her	   third	  admission	   in	   two	  months.	  Her	   stiffened	   lungs	  are	  not	  responding	  to	  the	  antibiotics	  and	  steroids	  that	  will	  clear	  infection	  and	  reduce	  inflammation.	  	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  round	  the	  charge	  nurse	  approaches.	  He	  tells	  you	  that	  Mrs	  Bird	  is	  to	  have	  a	  doxapram	  infusion.	  You	  feel	  your	  chest	  tighten.	  It’s	  a	  drug	  that	  makes	  patients	  breathe	  harder.	  It	  makes	  their	  muscles	  tremble.	  They	  don’t	  sleep.	  They	  are	  agitated.	  The	  last	  gravely	  ill	  person	  you	  managed	  on	  this	  drug	  reminded	  you	  of	   a	   hunted	   fox.	   You	   nursed	   him	   through	   the	   night,	   his	   sweat	   marking	   your	  shoulders	  with	  its	  stench	  as	  you	  moved	  him	  up	  and	  down	  the	  bed,	  trying	  to	  make	  him	   comfortable,	   the	   drug	   and	   its	   stimulus	   to	   breathe	   combating	   you	   in	   your	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efforts.	  He	  died	  a	   few	  days	   later.	  What	  about	  her	   steroids?	  Are	   they	   increasing	  the	  dose?	  Are	  they	  going	  to	  change	  her	  antibiotics?	  No,	  just	  doxapram.	  	  	  You	  begin	   to	  argue.	  What	   is	   the	  point	  of	  giving	  doxapram	  without	   treating	  any	  underlying	  condition?	  She	  wouldn’t	  be	  ventilated	  so	  why	  make	  her	  self	  ventilate?	  With	  no	  hope	  of	  alleviating	  underlying	  conditions	  she	  will	  self	  ventilate	  and	  most	  likely	  die	  on	  the	  drug.	  	  Your	   primary	   nurse	   arrives.	   The	   sentence	   ‘we	   don’t	   commit	   euthanasia’	   is	  spoken.	  Next	  is	  the	  junior	  doctor.	  You	  explain	  what	  is	  wrong.	  He	  takes	  you	  to	  the	  desk	  and	  draws	  a	  picture	  to	  show	  you	  how	  doxapram	  works	  on	  breathing	  rate	  and	  depth.	  You	  have	  a	  sudden	   flash	  of	  anger	  and	   feel	   like	  slapping	  him.	  You’ve	  worked	  in	  intensive	  care	  and	  so	  you	  slap	  him	  with	  this	  information	  instead.	  He	  apologises.	  Still	  no	  one	   ‘gets’	   it	  until	   the	  registrar	  arrives.	  You	  speak	  to	  him.	  He	  listens.	  He	  says	  he	   thinks	  you’re	  perfectly	  right.	  There	   is	  a	  moment	  of	   relief;	  at	  least	  you	  have	  been	  heard.	  But	  he	  continues,	  that	  the	  consultant	  is	  now	  gone	  and	  the	  team	  will	  follow	  his	  plan.	  Then	  comes	  desperation;	  nothing	  will	  change.	  You	  are	   not	   the	   person	   who	   can	   alter	   the	   course	   of	   medical	   treatment.	   You	   have	  argued	   your	   case.	   You	   have	   taken	   it	   to	   the	   highest	   level.	   You	   have	   been	  understood.	  But	  the	  senior	  doctor	  makes	  the	  decision.	  	  So	  stop.	  Take	  in	  what	  has	  happened	  so	  far.	  Touch	  the	  smooth	  steel	  of	  the	  artery	  forceps	   in	   your	  breast	  pocket.	   You	  have	   spent	   the	  morning	  helping	  patients	   to	  wash	  and	  to	  clamber	  to	  the	  commode.	  The	  Irish	  patient	  has	  joked	  with	  his	  fellow	  inmates	  that	  you	  are	   ‘the	  flasher’,	  you	  having	  woken	  him	  a	  few	  nights	  ago	  with	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your	  torch	  shining	  in	  his	  face	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  he	  wasn’t	  dead.	  He	  wasn’t	  dead,	  but	   the	   shock	   of	   waking	   to	   the	   bright	   light	   and	   you	   looming	   anxiously	   over	  almost	  killed	  him.	  You	  have	  travelled	  to	  and	  from	  the	  sluice	  to	  dispose	  of	  urine	  and	   faeces	   and	   then	   pushed	   the	   drugs	   trolley	   from	   bed	   to	   bed.	   You	   have	  informed	   relatives	   of	   a	   patient’s	   death	   and	   laid	   out	   the	   body	   ready	   for	   their	  arrival.	   Next	   door	   another	   patient	   is	   dying.	   You	   have	   cleaned	   his	   mouth	   and	  turned	  him.	  As	  is	  the	  case	  with	  every	  early	  shift,	  you	  sweat.	  	  Mrs	  Bird	  is	  looking	  out	  of	   the	  window,	   the	   fan	   that	  helps	  her	   feel	  more	  able	   to	  breathe,	  blowing	  a	  breeze	  into	  her	  face.	  	  The	   charge	   nurse	   sees	   that	   you	   are	   visibly	   distressed.	   Academics	   would	   state	  ‘morally	  distressed.’	  It’s	  the	  distress	  you	  feel	  because	  you	  believe	  you	  know	  the	  right	  action	  to	  take,	  but	  are	  not	  able	  to	  carry	  it	  out.	  	  He	  touches	  your	  arm	  –	  you	  will	  not	  forget	  his	  compassion.	  He	  tells	  you	  he	  can	  see	  how	  upset	  you	  are,	  that	  it	  is	   ok	   and	   he	   offers	   to	   put	   up	   the	   infusion	   for	   you.	   You	   have	   been	   offered	   the	  opportunity	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  carrying	  out	  a	  medical	  treatment.	  	  	  Let	  the	  ward	  lights	  dim.	  Let	  the	  scene	  fade	  to	  darkness.	  Let	  yourself	  take	  centre	  stage.	  Let	  the	  spotlight	  shine	  on	  you.	  It	  is	  time	  to	  examine	  your	  conscience.	  You	  have	  been	  asked	  to	  perform	  an	  action.	  You	  believe	  that	  the	  action	  is	  wrong.	  Most	  likely	  it	  is	  wrong.	  You	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  remove	  yourself	  from	  that	  action.	  Your	  charge	  nurse	  will	  assemble	  the	  equipment,	  prepare	  the	  infusion	  and	  attach	  it	  to	  Mrs	  Bird.	  He	  will	  set	  the	  rate	  and	  press	  the	  start	  button.	  Your	  ‘hands’	  will	  be	  clean.	   Such	   a	   simple	   answer	   to	   the	   situation.	   Your	   distress	   will	   ease.	   Your	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autonomy	  and	  integrity	  will	  be	  protected.	  But	  is	  this	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do?	  Ought	  you	  to	  be	  the	  focus?	  	  What	  about	  Mrs	  Bird?	  What	  about	  the	  other	  patients?	  	  	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  be	  their	  nurse	  and	  where	  does	  your	  responsibility	  lie?	  Most	  importantly	  where	  does	  your	  responsibility	  end?	  And	  when	  you	  define	  its	  limits	  –	   if	   you	   exchange	   some	   autonomy	   for	   some	   humility	   -­‐	   does	   it	   free	   you	   of	   a	  burden	  in	  order	  to	  do	  something	  else?	  	  	  The	  dying	  patient	  in	  the	  side	  room	  needs	  to	  be	  turned	  again.	  His	  mouth	  is	  dry.	  It	  is	   time	   to	   soak	   a	   sponge	   in	   water	   and	   then	   rest	   it	   in	   his	   mouth.	   He	   appears	  unconscious	  but	  will	   furiously	   suck	  when	   the	   sponge	   touches	  his	   tongue.	   Such	  matters	   are	   the	   responsibility	   of	   nurses.	   Tedious,	   repetitive	   and	   physically	  demanding	  labour	  that	  eases	  suffering	  and	  that	  literally	  protects	  patients’	  bodies	  from	  decay.	  	  	  	  Your	  code	  of	  conduct	  does	  not	  allow	  you	  to	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  carrying	  out	  medical	   treatment,	   or	   dare	   I	   go	   as	   far	   as	   to	   say	   ‘carry	   out	   a	   doctor’s	   orders’?	  Academics	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  your	  distress	  and	  your	  powerlessness.	  They	  wish	  to	  promote	   your	   professional	   autonomy.	   The	   solution	   is	   to	   alleviate	   it	   with	  empathic	  workshops,	  ethics	  rounds	  and	  egalitarian	  collaboration	  between	  health	  care	  teams.	  But	  this	  is	  a	  busy	  medical	  ward.	  Mrs	  Bird	  is	  getting	  up.	  She	  pulls	  at	  her	  nightdress.	  You	  need	   to	  make	   sure	   that	   she	  does	  not	  wet	  herself.	  That	   she	  sits	  down	  before	  she	  falls.	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There	   is	  an	  error	  made	   in	  medical	  ethics	  when	  your	  moral	  distress	  and	   lack	  of	  autonomy	   becomes	   the	   focus	   of	   research	   and	   attention.	   There	   is	  more	   to	   this	  scene	  than	  meets	  the	  eye	  of	  many	  ethicists.	  You	  are	  a	  nurse.	  You	  can	  engage	  in	  what	   is	  seen	  to	  be	   lofty	  debate	  about	  the	  rightness	  of	  medical	   intervention	  and	  indeed	   I	   do	   not	   want	   to	   suggest	   that	   you	   ought	   not	   to	   have	   argued	   the	   case	  	  against	  doxapram.	  An	  opiate	  would	  have	  eased	  her.	  However,	  don’t	   forget	   that	  the	  important	  person	  is	  Mrs.	  Bird.	  It	  is	  not	  you.	  Whilst	  you	  discuss	  and	  distress	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  she	  should	  have	  the	  drug,	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  put	  up	  the	  infusion	  or	  who	  else	  can	  do	  it	  if	  you	  don’t,	  Mrs.	  Bird	  is	  thirsty.	  She	  has	  been	  sat	  too	  long	  and	  the	  skin	  on	  her	  buttocks	  will	  start	  to	  peel.	  She	  hasn’t	  passed	  faeces	  for	   three	   days	   and	   is	   feeling	   bloated.	   Is	   thirst	   or	   constipation	   any	   less	   of	   a	  distressing	  symptom	  than	  side	  effects	  of	  a	  drug?	  Is	  it	  less	  deserving	  of	  attention?	  	  	  Take	  yourself	   to	  the	  medicine	  room.	  Prepare	  the	   infusion.	  Accept	  that	  you	  now	  perform	  an	  action	  for	  which	  you	  can	  limit	  what	  you	  are	  responsible	  for.	  It	  is	  the	  doctor	  who	  has	  prescribed	   the	  medication.	   It	   is	   the	  doctor	  who	  has	   refused	   to	  alter	   the	   course	  of	   treatment	  despite	  his	   agreement	  with	   you	   that	   it	   is	   not	   the	  best	  treatment	  to	  proceed	  with.	  This	  is	  not	  murder,	  it	  is	  at	  worst	  a	  bad	  medical	  decision,	  but	  who	  knows	  what	  might	  happen	  next?	  The	  odds	  are	   that	  Mrs	  Bird	  will	  die,	  but	  remember	  you	  deal	  in	  odds	  and	  they	  are	  not	  a	  certainty.	  Accept	  that	  at	  worst	  Mrs.	  Bird	  will	  most	   likely	   suffer	   side	  effects	   that	  will	  distress	  her	  and	  that	   in	   a	   better	   world	   she	   would	   not	   be	   receiving	   this	   drug.	   Accept	   that	   in	   a	  better	  world	  she	  would	  not	  suffer	  respiratory	   failure.	  Accept	   that	   in	   this	  world	  you	   can	   only	   do	   your	   best	   under	   the	   circumstances.	   Limit	   what	   you	   are	  responsible	  for	  -­‐	  you	  will	  be	  responsible	  for	  making	  sure	  that	  the	  drug	  is	  at	  the	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correct	  dosage,	  that	  it	  will	  infuse	  correctly	  and	  safely	  and	  that	  you	  will	  watch	  her	  closely	  for	  the	  coming	  hours.	  	  	  Know	  that	  you	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  free	  yourself	  from	  the	  burden	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  responsibility	   that	   it	   is	   you	   who	   will	   cause	   her	   to	   suffer	   when	   you	   start	   the	  infusion.	  Know	  that	   in	   freeing	  yourself	   from	  this	  burden	  you	  will	  be	   free	   to	  do	  something	   else	   for	   your	   patient	   that	   will	   be	   equally	   or	   more	   emotionally	  demanding	  to	  you	  than	  the	  guilt,	  anger	  and	  dread	  that	  you	  currently	  experience.	  You	  will	  be	  free	  to	  feel	  compassion.	  You	  will	  be	  free	  to	  consider	  her	  needs	  rather	  than	  your	  own.	  You	  will	  be	  free	  to	  nurse	  her	  –	  that	  is	  to	  remain	  close	  rather	  than	  avoid	  her,	  to	  walk	  with	  her	  whatever	  path	  unfolds.	  This	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  nursing	  –	  to	  remain	  with	  the	  patient	  and	  walk	  with	  them	  every	  step	  of	  the	  way;	  to	  remain	  with	   the	   patient	  when	   all	   the	   other	   professionals	  walk	   out	   of	   the	   door.	   If	   you	  conscientiously	  object	  to	  her	  treatment,	  if	  you	  walk	  away,	  you	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  her	  nurse.	  	  It	   is	   time	  to	  bring	   the	  medication	   to	  Mrs.	  Bird’s	  bedside.	  You	  push	   the	   infusion	  pump	  to	  her	  bedside.	  You	  sit.	  You	  touch	  her	  hand.	  You	  explain	  that	  the	  doctors	  have	  decided	   to	  give	  her	   some	  medicine.	  You	   tell	  her	   that	   it	  will	  help	  with	  her	  breathing.	  You	  tell	  her	  that	  you	  will	  keep	  an	  eye	  on	  her.	  She	  looks	  into	  your	  eyes	  and	  for	  a	  little	  while	  looks	  peaceful.	  It	  is	  not	  long	  before	  you	  see	  the	  tremors	  start	  in	  her	  hands.	  	  The	   act	   is	   done.	   You	   have	   made	   the	   decision	   to	   set	   up	   the	   infusion	   for	   your	  patient	   despite	   the	   charge	   nurse	   offering	   to	   do	   it	   for	   you.	   At	   the	   time	   you	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believed	  that	  you	  ought	  to	  follow	  your	  code	  of	  conduct,	  and	  carry	  out	  your	  duty	  to	  follow	  prescribed	  medical	  treatment.	  	  You	  went	  home	   that	   evening	   feeling	  defeated	  and	  with	   the	  emotional	   strain	  of	  having	  felt	  that	  you	  had	  done	  something	  in	  a	  caring	  manner	  that	  was	  wrong.	  You	  felt	  duplicitous.	  I	  wish,	  watching	  you	  ten	  years	  after	  the	  event,	  that	  your	  ethical	  reasoning	   had	   extended	   beyond	   your	   code	   of	   conduct	   duties	   and	   the	   sense	   of	  loss	  of	  integrity	  that	  resulted.	  If	  only	  you	  had	  had	  the	  humility	  to	  limit	  your	  sense	  of	   responsibility	  and	   in	   so	  doing	   that	  you	  had	   freed	  yourself	   to	   concentrate	  on	  nursing	  care.	  If	  only	  you	  hadn’t	  have	  felt	  inclined	  to	  take	  flight	  from	  Mrs	  Bird,	  as	  the	   researchers	  have	   found	  happens,	   because	  all	   you	   could	   see	  was	   the	  wrong	  doing	  of	  the	  medical	  intervention	  and	  your	  own	  complicity	  in	  causing	  that	  harm.	  	  	  If	  only	  you	  had	  also	  realized	  something	  else.	  That	  we	  are	  limited	  by	  the	  point	  of	  history	  with	  in	  which	  the	  stories	  of	  our	  lives	  are	  told.	  Today	  palliative	  care	  teams	  are	  involved	  with	  patients	  such	  as	  Mrs	  Bird.	  	  The	  limitations	  in	  her	  care	  were	  as	  much	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   times	   in	   which	   she	   was	   sick,	   as	   a	   reflection	   on	   the	  characters	  who	  crossed	  her	  path	  during	  her	  hospital	  stay.	  	  	  But	  the	  present	  tense	  does	  not	  have	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight.	  It	  is	  time	  to	  return	  to	  the	  year	  2000.	  You	  are	  in	  nurse’s	  uniform.	  Your	  name	  badge	  announces	  you	  as	  ‘staff	  nurse’.	  You	  arrive	  in	  the	  ward	  the	  next	  morning.	  At	  handover	  you	  ask	  how	  Mrs	  Bird	  has	  fared	  overnight.	  You	  are	  told	  that	  she	  died	  in	  the	  early	  hours	  with	  the	  doxapram	  infusion	  running.	  You	  know	  she	  had	  struggled	  for	  last	  hours	  of	  her	  life.	  There	  had	  been	  no	  palliation	  of	  her	  symptoms.	  Although	  her	  death	  was	  more	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difficult	  than	  it	  need	  to	  have	  been,	  she	  had	  been	  warm,	  she	  had	  not	  been	  thirsty	  and	  she	  had	  been	  cared	  for.	  As	  the	  dawn	  begins	  to	  break	  the	  junior	  doctor,	  who	  was	   on	   call	   all	   night,	   discusses	   the	   coming	  ward	   round	  with	   the	   charge	   nurse.	  The	  registrar	  is	  at	  home	  rising	  from	  his	  bed.	  The	  patients	  begin	  to	  switch	  on	  the	  machines	  by	  their	  beds,	  the	  sound	  of	  clapped	  out	  motors	  rising	  and	  filling	  the	  air.	  You	  are	  sad,	  weary	  and	  carry	  a	  burden	  of	  guilt	  but	  it	  is	  time	  to	  go	  and	  lay	  out	  Mrs	  Bird’s	   body	   in	   readiness	   to	   greet	   her	   son.	   He	   will	   be	   coming	   to	   pay	   his	   last	  respects	  soon.	  	  	  Conclusion	  	  I	  hope	  that	  this	  narrative	  has	  conveyed	  the	  emotional	  nature	  of	  moral	  distress	  as	  it	   is	   experienced	   by	   the	   nurse.	   This	   distress	   is	   perhaps	   uniquely	   difficult	   for	  nurses.	  They	  have	  an	  intimate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  patient.	  They	  have	  an	  intimate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  benefits	  and	  harms	  of	  medicine,	  and	  are	  intimately	  involved	  in	  the	  suffering	   that	  results	  both	   from	  disease,	  and	   from	  the	  practice	  of	  medicine.	  Despite	   this	   intimate	   knowledge,	   they	   are	   not	   in	   a	   position	   to	   make	   final	  decisions	  about	  what	  medical	  treatment	  will	  or	  will	  not	  be	  carried	  out.	  	  	  This	  narrative	   raises	   some	  of	   the	   issues	   that	   are	  not	   addressed	  by	  most	  of	   the	  current	   literature.	   In	   this	   narrative	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   nurses,	   once	   they	   have	  advocated	   for	   their	  patient,	   can	   absolve	   themselves	  of	   responsibility	   and	   carry	  out	  medical	  procedures	  without	  carrying	  responsibility	  for	  their	  outcome.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  prime	  responsibility	  of	  the	  nurse	  is	  to	  nurse	  her	  patient	  and	  that	  in	   doing	   so,	   she	   is	   free	   to	   express	   compassion,	   the	   emotion	   that	   is	   in	   itself	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distressing,[8]	  but	  that	  motivates	  her	  actions	  in	  satisfying	  the	  most	  basic	  of	  her	  patient’s	  needs.	  Such	  detachment	  from	  a	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  for	  some	  actions	  that	  the	  nurse	  may	  perform	  will	  no	  doubt	  have	  serious	  contenders.	  	  	  I	   have	   shown	   that	   the	   experience	   of	   ‘moral	   distress’	   most	   likely	   includes	   a	  variety	   of	   emotions,	  many	  of	  which	   are	   related	   to	   the	   incident	   in	   question	  but	  that	  are	  not	  moral	  in	  nature.	  Solomon	  has	  warned	  that	  although	  emotions	  can	  be	  accepted	  as	  moral	  judgements,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  correctly	  identify	  the	  object	  that	  they	   judge.[9]	   In	   this	   narrative,	   some	   of	   what	   could	   be	   identified	   as	   ‘moral	  distress’	   was	   instead	   a	   sense	   of	   dread	   and	   foreboding	   for	   Mrs	   Bird,	   based	   on	  memories	   of	   having	   cared	   for	   a	   patient	   on	   the	   same	   drug.	   Some	   distress	   was	  anger	   at	   the	   uncaring	   and	   dismissive	   attitude	   of	   the	   registrar.	   I	   suspect	   that	  much	  of	   the	  distress	  experienced	   in	   ‘moral	  distress’	   is	  an	  accumulation	  of	  such	  emotions	  and	  not	  specifically	  ‘moral’	  in	  nature.	  	  The	  potential	  for	  misidentification	  of	  moral	  judgments	  that	  arise	  from	  emotional	  reactions	  has	  meant	   that	   the	  most	   important	  question.	  That	   is,	   ‘what	  exactly	   is	  ‘moral	   distress’?’	   has	   not	   been	   answered	   by	   the	   literature,	   although	   many	  resolutions	  to	  it	  have	  already	  been	  proposed.	  Is	  it	  a	  valid	  emotional	  judgment	  of	  right	  and	  wrong	   that	  stands	  up	   to	  reasoned	  analysis?	  And	   if	   so,	   then	   that	   right	  and	  wrong	   has	   to	   be	  more	   explicitly	   identified.	   Is	   it	   a	   correct	   identification	   of	  wrong	   being	   done	   to	   patients,	   and	   if	   so,	   how	   are	   we	   going	   to	   put	   this	   right?	  Alternatively,	   is	   it	  a	  misidentification	  of	  wrong	  doing	   in	   the	  sense	  of	   individual	  agency,	  and	  that	  results	  in	  an	  erroneous	  sense	  of	  guilt	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  nurse?	  This	  narrative	  demonstrates	  that	  perhaps	  both	  are	  correct.	   In	  my	  narrative	  the	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nurse	   was	   wrong	   to	   feel	   morally	   distressed	   for	   actions	   that	   were	   the	  responsibility	   of	   someone	   else.	   But	   the	   medical	   decision	   to	   treat	   the	   patient	  aggressively	  rather	  than	  palliatively,	  was	  also	  wrong,	  at	  least	  with	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  which	   of	   course,	   as	   Dickenson	   [10]	   points	   out	   in	   her	   discussions	   of	  moral	  luck,	  offers	  a	  certainty	  that	  is	  not	  accessible	  in	  the	  present	  moment.	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